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Eastward enlargement of the EU raises questions of culture and national identity 
in two ways: firstly, is there a deep East-West divide in cultural values and the 
place of national identity in politics, which will make the absorption of new 
members from the East more difficult than has been the case with previous 
enlargements? And secondly, will greater cultural convergence be required to 
support deepening economic and political integration in the EU?
Despite very different historical trajectories, a clear dividing line between 
East and West in Europe cannot be drawn in cultural terms. There is significant 
diversity within each region, and significant overlaps between them. Cultures 
and national identities are constantly changing and adapting in response to 
pressures at both the global and local levels. Cultural uncertainties and anxieties 
in the face of change, and tensions between national identities and cultures and 
“Europeanisation” are apparent not only in new applicants to the EU, but also 
among existing member-states.
There is no evidence of a common European culture within the EU which 
could be used as a benchmark against which to measure the degree of 
convergence of applicants to some “European cultural norm”. However, there 
are basic standards of democratic politics, human rights and the Rule of Law on 
which wide agreement could be achieved. The EU should devote more attention 
to defining more clearly and consistently its basic political standards, and to 
ensuring that existing member-states' performance in respect of these standards 
is monitored as closely as that of prospective new members.
Overcoming the “democratic deficit” revealed in the process of 
deepening European integration will not be achieved by efforts to foster a 
European cultural identity transcending other, national, local, sectional 
identities. Diversity will remain the hallmark of European politics. Respect for 
the principle of subsidiarity is more likely to win popular confidence and 
support for the EU than attempts to promote cultural convergence “from 
above”.
The legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of its citizens will rest more on 
effectiveness in carrying out its mission than on identity. The accession of new 
members from the East will reaffirm the original mission of the EU as a 
framework for “overcoming the past” and promoting peace and security. The 
effectiveness of the EU and its policies in meeting the needs and expectations of 
its citizens in an era of rapid global change will play the decisive role in 






















































































































































































Questions of culture and national identity have come to the fore in 
contemporary European politics, and are now becoming a major factor in the 
dynamics of both widening and deepening integration in the European Union.
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe dramatically demonstrated 
the deep-rooted aspiration of the peoples of this region for “national self- 
determination”. Their demands for democracy, personal freedom and economic 
prosperity were inseparable from the reassertion of national identity, and the 
claim to the right to govern themselves in a way which would express and 
defend their national cultural traditions. At the same time, these demands were 
combined with the aspiration to “return to Europe”. These newly-assertive 
national cultural identities sought recognition as part of a broader “European 
family”. This reflected the expectation on the part of the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe that they would rapidly be accepted as rightful, equal members 
of the “European club”.
Joining the European Union was thus from the start seen by the new East 
European applicants as not merely a matter of rational economic interest, but as 
the symbolic affirmation of national-cultural destiny. This psychological 
dimension has ensured that the latest wave of EU enlargement, and the 
associated technical questions of timing, preparation and phasing, will be much 
more complex to manage politically than previous enlargements. The questions 
of which states can or should be included, when and on what terms they will 
join, were never going to be settled by the normal negotiating procedures 
around the diplomatic conference table, but would be fraught with acute 
sensitivities which have major repercussions for the internal politics of the new 
democracies, for the often rivalrous relations between them, and thus also for 
the broader stability of Europe as a whole.
The relationship between the affirmation of national identity and the 
practice of democracy in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe has 
proved to be more problematic than at first recognised. What had been 
overlooked was the fact that democracy, in and of itself, does not provide a 
means of defining the political community to which the state refers and to 
which it is to be held accountable. National identities in post-communist Europe 
did not everywhere coincide with the territorial boundaries of states frozen at 
the end of World War II. While Western Europe since the war has seen the 
establishment of stable democracies within territorial borders that are no longer 
contested, and have become increasingly more open with the progress of 




























































































Eastern half of the continent exposed much “unfinished business” on the agenda 
of national self-determination.
All three multinational communist federal states broke up when the 
communist monopoly of power collapsed, and a set of new nation-states were 
formed, most of which contained national and ethnic minorities which had not 
been consulted in the process, in some cases had actively opposed it, and 
everywhere felt less secure than before. Even in the existing nation-states such 
as Poland and Romania, conflicts about national identity, as well as the question 
of minority rights, have been prominent in the new political context.
*
Since 1989, therefore, Eastern Europe has seemed to be reverting to a 
peculiar historical pattern in which national identity is defined and asserted in 
collectivistic cultural terms, challenging existing states where these contain 
more than one cultural nation, and displacing the political principle of equal 
individual civic rights on which the practice of democracy depends. And yet 
democracy is the primary political condition for membership in the EU.
The prospect of enlargement to the east thus raises the questions of 
whether East European national and cultural identities are qualitatively different 
in character from those found in Western Europe, and whether, therefore, the 
two parts of the continent can compatibly combine in the project of building an 
integrated European polity. These questions are addressed in section II below.
The question of national identity has also begun to force itself onto the 
EU agenda in an unprecedented way in a direct response to deepening 
integration. At its origin and in the earlier phases of its development, the then 
European Community was held to have no bearing on the national identities and 
cultures of its member-states. It was a community based on the shared political 
values of democracy, individual rights and liberties, and the Rule of Law. It was 
not, nor ever was expected to become, a state on the model of the nation-state, 
but rather was conceived in federalist terms, which left cultural matters firmly 
in the hands of its component member-states.
In tackling the new tasks of deeper integration set by the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam treaties, in particular with the moves towards EMU and political 
union, the EU will inevitably impinge directly on areas of policy hitherto 
regarded as the preserve of the member-states, further eroding state 
“sovereignty”. The technocratic functionalist mode of integration has now 
reached the point where the federal question has to be faced. In many member- 
states, particularly within the governing elites of the original core group of 
founder-members, this possibility has always been accepted as part of the 




























































































common culture, if not at the level of daily life, at least at the level of business 
and government, and in this it has largely succeeded. There have been 
backlashes against excessive forms of harmonisation, but these have not 
hindered the project: to the extent that the federal question is now at the top of 
the agenda, it shows that some cultural convergence has already taken place.
However, the difficulties encountered in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty 
alerted elites throughout the Union to the danger that their societies may not 
view deepening integration with the same equanimity. Various forms of popular 
nationalistic backlash in the societies of the member states suggest that the 
major obstacles to deeper integration now include not only the technical 
complexities of the tasks, and the political complexities of elite-level inter­
governmental bargaining, but also mass public resistance to a perceived threat 
of cultural homogenisation under the remote, bureaucratic and unaccountable 
rule of “Brussels”.
Basic questions of political legitimacy and popular consent now face the 
Union as it sets about deepening integration leading to the formation of a 
European polity. These questions inevitably touch upon culture and identity, 
and are treated in section III below. Will the abstract political values of liberal 
democracy, and rational calculation of economic self-interest, be enough in 
future to secure popular consent in the emerging European polity? Or must 
“Europe” begin to develop a substantive, “thick”, common cultural identity to 
underpin its institutions? Is a “European” cultural identity either possible or 
necessary? How much common ground does there have to be for the purposes 
of the deeper political union to be achieved? These are questions which the EU 
would have faced even without enlargement to the East; but enlargement, 
insofar as it increases the diversity of cultures and national identities within the 




























































































I Is there an East-West Cultural Divide in Europe?
A long-term historical perspective points to deep continuities in the pattern of 
division in Europe which long pre-date the communist bifurcation of the 
continent. One frequently-cited historian, the Hungarian Jeno Szucs, has 
identified not two, but three distinct zones of cultural division in Europe - West, 
East and Central. Central Europe is an intermediate zone, exhibiting many of 
the traits of socio-economic backwardness, weak civil society, and the tendency 
for the state to develop an authoritarian character, which are evident further to 
the East. However, at certain times in its history, most obviously in the 
Renaissance and up to the early modem periods, Central Europe has been fully 
integrated into the mainstream of European culture, if not its vanguard. Even in 
the centuries of stagnation and oppression under imperial domination, proximity 
to the West brought Central Europe into close contact with the formative values 
of the Enlightenment and the challenges of socio-economic and political 
modernisation. Intellectual elites in these countries, in particular, identify more 
strongly with the liberal and democratic political and cultural values of the 
common European heritage than is the case in, for example, Russia.
The communist period saw the bifurcation of the continent, which 
overlay and for a time seemed to obliterate the distinction between the Central 
and the East European regions, as well as the national diversity within each 
region. The communist legacy is often argued to have moved Central Europe 
culturally further away from the West. This is hard to measure. In fact, general 
educational standards improved remarkably in the region as a result of 
communist policies of “catching up” with the West. This ought at least to mean 
the lowering of barriers to cultural convergence. Nevertheless, there remain 
significant lacunae in education and training in post-communist states which are 
painfully obvious in the shortages of appropriately qualified and experienced 
personnel for key positions in the economy, government administration and 
diplomacy. This is clearly a barrier to more rapid integration into the EU, but it 
does not necessarily signify a deep cultural gulf which cannot be overcome by a 
well-designed programme of training and know-how transfer.
Purely quantitative indicators as produced by opinion polling techniques 
can be very misleading in the interpretation of culture, if taken out of context. 
For example, secularism and individualism, which comparative survey data 
reveal in both Western and East European value-systems, could have 
completely different meanings in East and West, insofar as the processes which 
have produced these values are completely different. In contrast to the organic 
evolution of social values in the West, with its strong civil society independent 
of the state, in the East, secularisation had been enforced “from above” by the 




























































































and an ideological assault on popular mentalities. It could be argued that the 
result has been a kind of anomic “moral crisis” in societies where the 
intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment was already rather weakly embedded. 
Individualism in this context can take the form of pure egoism, a self-centred 
hedonism which signals a total loss of the value of altruism on which civil 
society depends. However, this problem may not be confined to post-communist 
Europe, as discussed below.
In assessing the cultural legacies of communism, it is important to 
remember that the communist regimes themselves differed from state to state, 
with varying effects on the evolution of national identities and cultures. In 
Poland and Hungary, for example, communism took on a distinctive, national- 
reformist character after 1956. Contacts with Western Europe were less severely 
impeded than elsewhere, and the regimes themselves were somewhat more open 
and responsive to the aspirations of their peoples. In Romania, on the other 
hand, the peculiarly oppressive Ceausescu dictatorship manipulated national 
identity and played on xenophobic tendencies in ways which continue to make 
themselves felt today both in domestic political discourse and in the state's 
relations with its neighbours and with the wider Europe.
Both long-term and more recent historical patterns could well contribute 
to the explanation of why some post-communist states and societies are 
evidently “doing better” than others when it comes to preparing themselves for 
EU membership. What seems to be most significant in this respect is the 
presence or absence of an underlying cultural consensus within the political 
elites, and between the elites and their societies, about the place of that nation in 
Europe. Where the “return to Europe” is widely accepted as a self-evident 
matter of national destiny, and appreciated as the means of protecting and 
promoting national cultural identity, then we find extraordinary readiness on the 
part of societies to endure the upheaval of economic transformation and align 
their political and legal systems to the requirements of joining the EU. This 
seems to be characteristic of development in Central European states like 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
On the other hand, in Romania, for example, while elites enthusiastically 
insist on the essentially “European” character of Romanian national culture, and 
therefore its right to be considered ready for membership of the EU, at the same 
time they can display reluctance and sometimes a resentful attitude towards 
pressure to accelerate economic transformation and adapt political institutions 
and practices (notably in the field of minority rights) to meet the demands of EU 
entry. It may well be that insistence on one's “Europeanness” in cultural terms is 




























































































The new states formed out of collapsed communist federations also seem 
more insecure and sensitive about their national identities and their newly-won 
“sovereignty”. While they may be as firmly wedded to the idea of their 
“European” identity and as committed to joining the EU as others, their vision 
of “Europe” may be one of fully “nationalised” (in the sense of ethnically 
homogenised) states, rather than of an open, transnational community of shared 
political values. They are thus more likely to encounter “Europe” as an alien 
cultural force, threatening national identity, when the EU insists on reforms 
which are seen as touching upon state sovereignty.
However, these considerations must be taken alongside an appraisal of 
the state of play in Western Europe. The questions which we pose about 
prospective new member-states of the enlarging Union can also be asked of 
existing member-states. The relationship between national identity and 
European identity is a live issue for nearly all member-states today, and we find 
important differences among them. For some, such as Germany and Italy, 
embracing “Europe” has been part and parcel of a process of redefining national 
identity in a secure, democratic framework; but deepening European political 
and economic integration could well threaten this national consensus in future. 
For other member-states, such as Great Britain, the relationship with Europe 
remains unresolved and surrounded by ambivalent feelings. Joining “Europe” 
has coincided with a long period of national decline, and has, for many, become 
associated with a sense of loss: of empire, of national prestige and self- 
confidence, of economic preeminence. British anxieties about the further loss of 
national sovereignty implied in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have 
been compounded more recently by the prospect of fragmentation of the state 
with the establishment of new Scottish and Welsh assemblies. Thus if European 
integration poses a challenge to national identities and cultures, then it is one 
faced to a greater or lesser extent by every European state, and not just the 
prospective new members from Central and Eastern Europe.
Moreover, the “moral crisis” which some would see in post-communist 
Europe may be not be unique to that region, but rather a more intense version of 
a malaise which is evident across Europe. For the collapse of communism also 
had a marked, and to some extent unexpected, impact on the place of national 
identity and culture in the politics of Western Europe. It hastened the decline of 
the “grand narratives” of ideology which had hitherto defined the basic political 
cleavage along a left-right axis. This has coincided with a seismic shift in the 
global economic context, leading to new perplexities about fundamental values, 
and about the feasible strategies and policies open to politicians. The old 




























































































With the shackles of ideology removed, the politics of identity has once 
again broken through to the surface of West European politics. In many states, 
this has found expression in resurgent regionalist and minority nationalist 
movements. Moreover, the advent of globalised communications has 
contributed to weakening the capacity of states to cage and control cultural life 
within national frameworks. One result has been to accelerate the pluralisation 
and fragmentation of national cultures. But has this paved the way for the 
emergence of a common “European” culture and identity? To be sure, the use of 
English as a lingua franca is increasingly widespread; travel and the emergence 
of mass tourism bring greater familiarity and contribute to demystifying “alien” 
cultures; pop music, films and satellite TV now reach mass audiences 
irrespective of national borders. Whether this is leading or is likely to lead to 
substantive convergence in cultural values remains, however, a matter of doubt. 
On the one hand, these contacts may have a rather superficial effect, and in any 
case are likely to be assimilated into pre-existing cultural contexts. Thus 
whether the net effect of increased cross-cultural contact is to promote 
convergence, or to enhance awareness of difference, and even confirm 
prejudice, can hardly be generally predicted.
On the other hand, what evidence there is for a common culture 
transcending national frontiers points to its being global, rather than 
distinctively European, in content. Its sources are as much, if not more, extra- 
European than European, given the vital role of the US in cultural innovation, 
production and distribution. And this global culture is as easily available and 
readily consumed throughout the rest of the world as it is in Europe. It is 
difficult to see culture of this sort contributing to a coherent political identity 
which might underpin the process of constructing an integrated European 
polity.
Thus while there are good historical reasons to expect an East-West, or 
East-Central-West, cultural divide in contemporary Europe, it is by no means 
the only, nor necessarily the most problematic cultural challenge facing the new 
Europe. One could point to increasing divergence between globalised regions, 
fully exposed to and successfully integrated into a new international economy, 
and regions “left behind”, unable to benefit from it. The division between core 
and periphery in Europe is one which cuts across state borders, and across the 
East-West divide: compare, for example, the dynamism of north-west Hungary, 
rapidly inserting itself into global networks, with the neighbouring Austrian 
province of Burgenland, where rural parochialism gives rise to demands for 
protectionism and resistance to opening up to the East. Our focus on the East- 
West division should not allow us to forget the salience of the long-standing 
North-South divide in Western Europe, which will not disappear with 




























































































generational lines, and along educational lines, greatly affecting the capacity of 
individuals to adapt and thus realise their life-chances in a unified European 
economic space. In confronting the problem of cultural diversity/cultural 
convergence in Europe, we need multi-dimensional “profiles” which can take 
into account the internal diversity within states, as well as the overlaps in 
cultural patterns across states and larger regional groupings. Such profiles 
would no doubt reveal a very mixed and changing picture of both cultural 
convergence in some fields and persisting, possibly deepening, divergence in 
others.
A further conclusion at this point would be the need for extreme caution 
in embarking on the exercise of defining the role of national identity and culture 
in the future political dynamics of enlargement. We find it increasingly hard to 
say what a “national” culture consists in, given the degree of openness to global 
influences, the fragmentation and pluralisation, and the dynamic fluidity that is 
characteristic of modem societies. How to measure the “fit” between such an 
elusive thing as a “national” identity and a “European” identity which is itself 
even more of a chimera?
Moreover, the new applicants can rightly point out that such questions 
were never before raised in connection with previous EU enlargements. 
Bringing “culture” onto the agenda as a particular problem in the case of the 
new Central and East European applicants looks like yet another symptom of 
West Europeans deploying their prejudices in order to justify delaying 
enlargement. We need therefore to ask why, and in what respects, “culture” is 
relevant to the assessment of the capacity of a prospective member-state to take 
on the formal acquis, and to match the performance of existing member-states in 
implementing it. We need also to consider whether the future deepening of 
European integration will require a greater degree of cultural consensus among 




























































































II The Implications for Enlargement
It could well be argued that “culture” is not a relevant factor at all in assessing 
prospective applicants for EU membership. Economic compatibility and 
geopolitical security are likely to be the overriding considerations, and both are 
much more amenable to rational analysis than culture. So is the formal 
constitutional framework of applicants. Member-states must be democracies, 
guaranteeing basic human rights and freedoms, established and maintained by 
the Rule of Law. General agreement on the basic conditions for the realisation 
of these political criteria can be reached, while recognising that they can operate 
satisfactorily in a wide variety of cultural contexts. Therefore the EU should 
confine itself to assessing applicant states' formal institutions and the efficiency 
of their functioning.
However, culture, in the narrower sense of political culture - values, 
attitudes, ingrained patterns of behaviour - does enter into the equation, insofar 
as the stability of democratic institutions, the real enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms, and the quality of the Rule of Law all presuppose an underlying web 
of more or less unspoken, taken-for-granted common understandings and 
assumptions. The practice of democracy may degenerate into demagogy and 
authoritarian populism in the context of a society which defines the “nation” in 
collectivistic and homogenising ethnic terms, overriding the rights of 
individuals and minorities. The Rule of Law may be subverted by informal and 
corrupt networks of family, clan, party or business associates.
A proper qualitative assessment of the degree to which prospective 
applicants really meet the political conditions for EU membership will thus 
inevitably touch upon the cultural aspect. In order to avert the charge of 
arbitrariness and bias, increased efforts are needed on the part of the EU and its 
member-states to define a consistent and unambiguous set of common basic 
standards by which to measure the performance of political and legal 
institutions. This will have to be accompanied by greater willingness on the part 
of member-states to open up their own practices to scrutiny. If we are to demand 
that prospective new member-states live up to high standards in the functioning 
of their political and legal institutions, we cannot avoid turning the spotlight on 
shortcomings of performance among existing member-states. “Cultural 
specifics” may explain, but cannot be allowed to excuse any member-state 
falling below the agreed common standards.
An important consideration in planning for eastward enlargement is that 
cultures and formal institutional structures are intimately and inextricably 
linked, forming a dynamic, mutually reinforcing symbiosis. This linkage is not a 




























































































independently of the institutional structures, nor can we safely posit a set of 
cultural “preconditions” for a “successful” democracy. To what extent cultural 
values actually determine the behaviour of political elites in specific crisis 
situations is far from clear. Moreover, values change and adapt over time, and 
can be significantly altered by a new institutional context which provides 
different incentives and rewards for behaviour, thus inducing value change. 
While it may well be the case that no democratic institutions can be expected to 
endure in the long term without a complementary and supportive underlying 
democratic political culture, if such institutions can be supported and held in 
place long enough (with possibly external support), democratic values have a 
good chance of developing and becoming embedded in everyday political life, 
as the case of post-war West Germany illustrates well.
The implications of this for EU enlargement are far-reaching. Being 
admitted into the EU as full members could provide the necessary external 
support for fragile new democratic institutions. The incentives offered by the 
prospect of economic prosperity and a stable security framework within the EU 
are already having a powerful impact on patterns of political behaviour as well 
as on specific measures of political and constitutional reform in all ten applicant 
countries. Two frequently-posed questions are whether the EU's decision to 
manage enlargement in stages is likely to weaken irretrievably the support for 
democracy in those states relegated to the “second wave”; and whether the early 
admission of new members, even before their democratic institutions are fully 
consolidated, will weaken the incentives to cultural adaptation, and lead to the 
incorporation of “difficult” new members who act as a further burden on the 
already complex processes of deepening integration.
On the first question, despite dire warnings of disillusion and despair 
among “second tier” applicants, there is by no means convincing evidence of a 
cultural rejection of democratic values or “European” identity. Voters in 
Slovakia and Latvia have recently demonstrated a readiness to change, in the 
first case their government, in the second their citizenship law, in ways which 
are likely to ease their path towards EU accession. The EU's standard-setting 
thus continues to have a positive impact which is welcomed by democratic and 
human rights activists within these countries themselves; but they also point out 
that the effectiveness of this could be enhanced by more consistency and clarity 
in the demands made by EU political conditionality. This confirms the need for 
more concerted attention on the part of the EU and its member-states to the 
definition of an explicit, coherent set of political standards applicable to all.
Nevertheless, enlargement in stages certainly complicates already 
difficult problems for many applicants of their mutual relations. In deciding to 
manage enlargement by stages, the EU has to accept its own responsibility to 




























































































which link the “first wave” Central and East European applicants for 
membership with others: of Poland to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania; of 
Hungary to Romania and Slovakia, for example. The terms and conditions of 
entry set by the EU should not be allowed to make managing these relations 
more difficult than before. This is particularly relevant in the field of border 
controls.
The question of whether the new member-states will prove “awkward 
partners” for the EU begs a prior question: what reasons are there to suppose on 
cultural grounds that they will be more “awkward” than many existing member- 
states? The future new members from Central and Eastern Europe may in fact 
bring with them a more intense commitment to the idea of a common European 
culture by virtue of their insecure position at the periphery, while those long- 
established at the “core” of Europe may enjoy the “luxury” of indifference or 
even resistance to the promotion of cultural convergence. The influx of new 
East European members could therefore give a fresh impetus to integration, 
rather than acting as an obstacle to it.
This argument is attractive. Even if the data on the extent of East-West 
cultural convergence is ambiguous, there are other grounds, in terms of their 
vital national security and economic interests, for supposing that the prospective 
new Eastern member-states will bring a special commitment to making 
integration work. Long and unfortunate historical experience of their “geo­
political predicament” between Russia and Germany has undoubtedly forged 
deep motivations to join and to help further develop the EU as the only viable 
alternative to the precarious position of a “buffer zone” of unstable and 
vulnerable small nation-states. This motivation is fully consistent with the 
original raison d'etre of the European Community.
It is also likely, however, that the closer the applicants move toward full 
membership, the more we will encounter signs of resistance to aspects of 
“Europeanisation” - as Polish farmers and the Catholic Church have both on 
occasions demonstrated. The Polish government itself has recently been 
criticised for complacency and over-estimation of its bargaining power with the 
EU, leading to slow progress in the practical implementation of reforms. The 
widespread popular commitment to “joining Europe” revealed in public opinion 
surveys does not prevent 5 million Poles tuning in regularly to the quirkily 
xenophobic broadcasts of Radio Marija. Similar examples could be found 
elsewhere - including in existing EU member-states - to demonstrate that a 





























































































This brings us on to the wider question of how much cultural 
convergence is needed for the purposes of deepening political and economic 
integration in the EU. It is already evident that the hugely ambitious project of 
monetary union has encountered as many cultural constraints as technical ones. 
National currencies may be argued on economic grounds to have outlived their 
usefulness, but they retain symbolic value, especially - but not only - in 
Germany. The future smooth functioning of the single currency seems unlikely 
to be secured without some central mechanism for financial transfers to 
compensate disadvantaged regions and states. How these resources are to be 
collected and distributed are questions not merely of economics but of political 
legitimacy and popular consent. It is these considerations which have prompted 
some to argue for the active promotion of a common European cultural identity. 
An integrated European polity, like any other state, it is argued, will need the 
underpinning of a “thick” consensus on values going beyond the “thin” one 
achieved so far on minimal shared political standards.
But the EU is not, and will not become a state on the nation-state model. 
There is little evidence that the European institutional framework has so far 
succeeded in moulding a coherent “European” cultural identity which could 
provide that instinctive feeling of political loyalty generated in the past by the 
sense of national identity. Opinion polls do show that a majority of people in 
Europe - including even the British - admit to feeling “European” at times and 
in certain circumstances; but this is always in addition to, and usually less 
intensely felt than, their national or regional identity. Multiple identities have to 
be taken as the reality of contemporary Europe. What is noteworthy, however, is 
that the sense of cultural “Europeanness” is not translated into enthusiasm for 
EU institutions. The EU has been notably ineffective in mobilising the level of 
common feeling that actually exists for its project of integration. The 
“democratic deficit” persists.
Some would see the solution in strengthening the powers of the European 
parliament, in the hope that a more active and assertive body would attract more 
interest, and ultimately more support, from the citizens of the Union. Others 
would argue for an intensified effort through policies in the fields of education 
and culture to persuade Europeans to link their identities with the EU. Both of 
these proposals rest on the assumption that “culture” can be deliberately 
reshaped “from above”, by government policies and elite-led campaigns. But 
history provides us with much evidence of the imperviousness of “culture”, as a 
slow-growing, complex product of human activity at all levels, to such 
influences. In any case, this approach smacks of “nation-state” thinking which 
is not appropriate for the emergent European polity, and is in any case 




























































































the problem is to make European citizens change their views, rather than to 
improve and reform the functioning of the institutions.
The emergent European polity will have to rest on shared commitment to 
rules and procedures perceived as fair and efficient, on the principle of 
toleration and institutional guarantees of respect for diversity. This might be 
seen as a weak, “thin” form of legitimacy, in contrast to the “thick” common 
cultural identity which has underpinned powerful nation-states; but this only 
poses insuperable problems if we envisage the EU as a kind of nation-state writ 
large. What sort of identity Europe needs can only be answered in the light of 
what tasks which we expect it to take on, and what powers we are prepared to 
transfer to its institutions to carry out those tasks. Current trends point towards 
the evolution of a complex multi-level polity, in which tasks are shared between 
the Union, the member-states, and sub-state levels on the basis of the principle 
of subsidiarity. National identities and cultural differences will continue to be a 
potent factor in politics at the EU level, and enlargement to the East will no 
doubt add new spice to the stew. The legitimacy of the EU, however, will be 
built on quite different terrain, which has more to do with effectiveness than 
identity.
Enlargement to the East will represent a reaffirmation of the EU's original 
raison d'etre as a framework for peace and prosperity, overcoming the 
continent's uniquely destructive and self-defeating past. The importance of this 
for the new member-states may to some extent counteract the declining salience 
of the lessons of the past in the political imagination of West Europeans, as a 
younger generation without direct experience of the Second World War takes 
over. But the EU's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its citizens will 
depend even more on its performance in meeting their current and future needs. 
The EU has to prove its value as a framework for meeting the coming 
challenges of the global economy, which promotes the competitiveness of its 
producers while securing the welfare and well-being of its citizens. Elements of 
an emerging pan-European consensus can be discerned in the language of the 
“new social democracy”, combining traditional aspirations for a “social Europe” 
centred on the values of social justice and social cohesion, with a pragmatic 
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